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Abstract: 
In this paper, Event Studies are conducted to examine the effects of political events on foreign 
exchange returns in Malaysia, Singapore and Philippines. The political events of interest in this 
paper cover the general elections in all three countries. Some of the salient findings are as 
follows. First, the 13th General Election in Malaysia led to a mostly negative response from the 
foreign exchange market, with a sharper than expected Ringgit depreciation. Second, the 14th 
Malaysian General Election elicited a rather positive reaction from the foreign exchange 
market – there was far less depreciation of the Ringgit than what was previously believed. 
Third, both the 2011 and 2015 General Elections in Singapore were followed by positive 
reactions from the market. Fourth, presidential elections in the Philippines produced 
contrasting results – the election of Benigno Aquino III was greeted with optimism, whereas 
his successor, Rodrigo Duterte received a less welcoming reception from the foreign exchange 
market, with the Philippine Peso depreciating more than the predicted amount in the market 
model. 
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Introduction 
The volatility and predictability of asset returns have been the subject matter of a mounting 
number of studies in the central banking and policy-making circles. Starting from Mishkin 
(2001), and later extended by the likes of Gali (2013), Blot, Hubert and Labondance (2017), 
Dong, Miao and Wang (2018), the concern centers around whether a central bank should use 
monetary policy as a device to restrain runaway asset market booms. Shedding light on the 
behaviour of asset markets thus become a matter of paramount importance.  
 
To facilitate better understanding of the determinants of asset price behaviour, and how 
political risks may have a role to play, a burgeoning literature has emerged. One strand of the 
literature focuses on how political events affect stock market returns and volatility (Bialkowski, 
Gottschalk and Wisniewski, 2008; Durnev, 2010; Lean, 2010; Kollias, Papadamou and 
Stagiannis, 2011; Chesney, Reshetar and Karaman, 2011; Nazir et al, 2014; Yusoff et al, 2015; 
Liew and Rowland, 2016). Another strand of the literature examines the effects of political 
events on the foreign exchange markets (Lobo and Tufte, 1998; Mpofu and Peters, 2017). 
Taken together, these studies have implications for the efficiency of asset markets and the 
rationality of the investment community.  
 
In the light of the literature, we intend to examine the nexus of politics and asset markets, with 
a particular focus on how general elections affect the foreign exchange markets in the ASEAN 
region. In this paper, we focus particularly on the impact of general elections and political 
scandals on foreign exchange returns in Malaysia, Singapore and the Philippines. There are 
compelling reasons why this research makes sense. In the context of the current topic, the 
countries covered here do not receive much attention in the literature. Moreover, the ASEAN 
area was the epicenter of the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis. The Crisis was touted by many 
observers to be a result of fundamental macroeconomic weaknesses partly arising from 
political-economic factors (IMF, 1997). There has been very little change since the Crisis, so 
the politics-asset market nexus is still relevant (Sen and Tyce, 2017). More importantly, both 
Malaysia, Singapore and Philippines have experienced political regime changes in recent years. 
From a foreign investor's perspective, there remains little understanding of how an investor can 
time her entry/exit strategies in the light of certain political events. How the asset markets 
respond to the political environment remains a highly relevant and interesting problem area, 
and we intend to make contributions to this end. The study produces some stylised facts and 
detailed observations of exchange rate movements resulting from particular political episodes. 
 
In this paper, we assess the Malaysian foreign exchange market responses to the 13th and 14th 
General Elections. For Singapore, we analyse how foreign exchange markets in Singapore 
responded to the 2011 and 2015 General Elections. Finally, in the case of the Philippines, we 
assess foreign exchange market reactions to the 2010 and 2016 General Elections. We would 
have liked to cover Thailand and Indonesia as well, but for the poor fit between the data and 
the model estimates – as such, the latter two countries would have to be covered in another 
study. Foreign exchange returns in each country are proxied by the bilateral nominal exchange 
rates, expressed as the value of US Dollar in terms of the domestic currency. We deploy event 
studies as our methodology. In this framework, we first estimate ‘market models’ of the returns 
for spot Ringgit/US Dollar (RM/USD) exchange rate, spot Singapore Dollar/US Dollar 
(SGD/USD) exchange rate and spot Philippine Peso/US Dollar (PHP/USD) exchange rate. The 
data spans daily observations from 13 February 2012 to 2 April 2013, in the case of Malaysia. 
For Singapore, data covers 5 February 2010 to 29 March 2011. Meanwhile, the data for 
Philippines are from 14 July 2008 to 17 March 2010. In all market models, we use a 250-day 
estimation window. The event day is defined as the polling day of the general election. For the 
event, we set 20 pre-event days, one event day and 60 post-event days giving a total of 81 days 
in one event window. Next, the Abnormal Returns (ARs) and Cumulative Abnormal Returns 
(CARs) are calculated for each of the event. Parametric statistical tests are then applied on the 
ARs and CARs to determine their statistical significance.  
 
The salient findings of the paper are as follows. First, the CARs after the 13th Malaysian 
General Elections are statistically significant, positive and trending up, indicating unfavourable 
market response. Second, in the aftermath of the 14th Malaysian General Election, the CARs 
are statistically significant and mostly in negative territory, signs of a positive market response. 
These foreign exchange fluctuations coincide closely with conventional beliefs that the regime 
of Najib Razak, which retained power in the 13th general election, was unpopular. However, 
the collapse of this regime was greeted with exuberance in the 14th general election. For 
Singapore, the foreign exchange market responses to both the 2011 and 2015 General Elections 
are largely positive, characterised by negative and declining CARs. The elected governments 
have performed well historically, so the market reaction could serve as confirmation of this 
fact. Meanwhile, in the Philippines the market responded positively to the election of Benigno 
Aquino III in the 2010 election. In contrast, market response to the election of Rodrigo Duterte 
in 2016 has been unequivocally negative. As a controversial figure, Duterte’s subsequent 
policies have been criticised as extreme and unwarranted. Interestingly, foreign exchange 
markets were able to sound off similar sentiments. 
 
The paper is organised in the following manner. In the next section, we summarise the literature 
that motivate our research design and methodologies. This is followed by an overview of the 
data and methodologies followed by the results, findings and further discussions. The paper 
concludes thereafter. 
 
Literature review 
(i) Political events and financial markets – scope of study and key findings 
This study contributes to the literature on political events and how they affect the mean and 
volatility of returns in asset markets.  We identify some of the studies that are relevant this area 
including Lobo and Tufte (1998), Bialkowski, Gottschalk and Wisniewski (2008), Durnev 
(2010), Lean (2010), Kollias, Papadamou and Stagiannis (2011), Chesney, Reshetar and 
Karaman (2011), Nazir et al (2014), Yusoff et al (2015), Bin (2015), Liew and Rowland (2016), 
Wong and Hooy (2016), Mpofu and Peters (2017), Bowes (2018), Chia (2018) and Hou and Li 
(2019). Most studies focus on the effects of political events on the stock and foreign exchange 
markets, except for Chesney et al (2011) who also covered commodity and bond markets. 
There is no unique definition of what constitutes a political event. The ones which are 
frequently assessed include general elections, political news and power struggles in the 
government. For example, Hou and Li (2019) examined how anti-corruption campaigns in 
China affected stock returns. Others focus on the effects of terrorist attacks (Chesney et al 2011; 
Kollias et al 2011) and the style of governance (Nazir et al 2014).  
 
In most of the studies mentioned above, general elections and negative political news tend to 
lead to lower mean asset returns (Lean 2010; Liew and Rowland 2016) and increased volatility 
(Lobo and Tufte 1998; Bialkowski, Gottschalk and Wisniewski 2008, Bowes 2018). However, 
Wong and Hooy (2016) and Chia (2018) are exceptions to the norm as asset market reactions 
may be muted. Similarly, Yusoff et al (2015) found that stock returns in politically-connected 
firms do not respond as expected to negative news. Making sense of all the findings, it seems 
that the extent of uncertainty resulting from political events is a rather important condition. If 
things are seen to be under control, reactions from asset markets would be milder, as discovered 
by Nazir et al (2014). The idea that asset markets do not react uniformly is also echoed in Hou 
and Li (2019) particularly in the context of China and Chesney et al (2011) in the case of 
European countries. A decline in the market could be followed by varying degrees of recovery.  
 
All in all, we are able to extract three theoretical explanations for observed asset market 
reactions to political events. Firstly, political events induce uncertainty, leading to negative 
reactions by investors ((Hou and Li, 2019, Chesney et al. 2011, Kollias et al 2011). Secondly, 
market reactions could signal the degree of approval in regard to a particular political event 
(Nofsiner, 2004). Thirdly, investors may display too much optimism initially but eventually 
make corrections in their expectations when the newly elected regime performs below 
expectations (Booth and Booth, 2003). 
 
(ii) Methodologies 
The literature cited above favours three methodologies. The first is the specification and 
estimation of time series models with rate of return on a financial asset as the dependent 
variable, and proxies of political risks as explanatory variables (Lean 2010), Bin 2015), Liew 
and Rowlands 2016, Bowes 2018). To capture the effects of such events on returns and 
volatility of returns, dummy variables are usually used in either a linear regression or a GARCH 
(Generalised Autoregressive Conditional Heteroskedasticity) family of models.   
 
The second methodology is event studies (Bialkowski et al 2008, Nazir et al 2015, Yusoff et al 
2015, Mpofu and Peters 2017, Hou and Li 2019). Event studies has been commonly used in 
empirical finance to assess the qualitative and quantitative effects that financial securities have 
in reaction to shocks (Kliger and Gurevich 2014). In Event Studies, econometric models of the 
first methodology are used to estimate benchmarks for normal asset returns or volatility in the 
sample period before the event whose effects are being examined. Parameter estimates of the 
empirical models are ‘extrapolated’ to a future period in which political events are occurring. 
Actual asset returns (volatility) are then compared with the extrapolated values to calculate 
abnormal returns (volatility). By adding up the abnormal returns (volatility), one obtains the 
cumulative abnormal returns (volatility). Importantly, the first methodology is distinguished 
from the second by the set-up of the estimation window. The estimation window precedes the 
event window in event studies whereas in econometric models, the estimation window covers 
the event being studied. Finally, there are researchers who combine the first two methodologies 
in a single paper (Chesney et al 2011), Kollias et al 2011, Chia 2018).  
 
(iii) Implications for research 
In this paper, we analyse how foreign exchange markets respond to shocks from the general 
elections in Malaysia and Singapore. To our knowledge, this is the first paper to attempt such 
an enterprise. Methodologically, we apply the event study toolkit frequently used in the 
literature (more details in next section). We compile and analyse a set of data that has not been 
analysed in previous studies. We highlight this as the main value and contribution to the 
literature. In the next section, we explain our data and methodology in further detail. 
 
Data and Methodology 
(i) Data 
This study attempts to assess the reaction of the returns for spot Ringgit/US Dollar (RM/USD) 
exchange rate, the spot Singapore Dollar/US Dollar (SGD/USD) exchange rate and the spot 
Philippine Peso/US Dollar (PHP/USD) exchange rate in response to general elections. Before 
this can be carried out, we must first estimate a market model of exchange rate behaviour for 
each country as per the event study literature in the previous section. We estimate the market 
model of spot RM/USD exchange rate for Malaysia with daily data covering 13 February 2012 
to 2 April 2013, and also estimate a market model of daily spot SGD/USD exchange rate for 
Singapore, covering 5 February 2010 to 29 March 2011. For Philippines, our data cover 14 
July 2008 to 17 March 2010. For all countries, the estimation window is 250 days in line with 
the practices in the empirical literature for event studies. Daily data for both exchange rates are 
collected for the estimation window. We use daily data because it leads to a higher degree of 
accuracy (Brown and Warner 1985). 
 
For the Malaysia market model, the dependent variable is the returns on spot RM/USD 
exchange rate (source: Bank Negara Malaysia Monthly Statistical Bulletin), while the 
independent variables are interest rate differentials between domestic (overnight interbank rate, 
obtained from Bank Negara Malaysia Monthly Statistical Bulletin) and foreign interest rates 
(proxied by US 3-month Treasury Bill rate from Federal Reserve Economic Data (FRED)), 
returns on the spot exchange rates of US Dollar/Euro (USD/EUR) (source: ECB), Yen/US 
Dollar (Y/USD) (source: Bank of Japan) and Chinese Yuan/US Dollar (RMB/USD) (source: 
FRED).  
 
The market model for Singapore and Philippines follow a similar set-up. For the Singapore 
market model, the dependent variable is the returns on spot SGD/USD exchange rate (source: 
Monetary Authority of Singapore). The independent variables include interest rate differentials 
between domestic (average overnight rate, sourced from Monetary Authority of Singapore) and 
foreign interest rates (proxied by US 3-month Treasury Bill rate from Federal Reserve 
Economic Data (FRED)), and the returns on the spot exchange rates of US Dollar/Euro 
(USD/EUR) (source: ECB), Yen/US Dollar (Y/USD) (source: Bank of Japan) and RM/USD 
(source: Bank Negara Malaysia Monthly Statistical Bulletin. 
 
Meanwhile, the Philippines market model has the returns on the Peso/USD (PHP/USD) 
exchange rate as dependent variable. The independent variables are interest rate differentials 
between domestic (interbank call loan rate, obtained from Central Bank of Philippines) and 
foreign interest rates (proxied by US 3-month Treasury Bill rate from Federal Reserve 
Economic Data (FRED)), returns on the spot exchange rates of US Dollar/Euro (USD/EUR) 
(source: ECB), Yen/US Dollar (Y/USD) (source: Bank of Japan) and Chinese Yuan/US Dollar 
(RMB/USD) (source: FRED).  
 
More descriptions of the market model are found in the next section on Methodology. 
Meanwhile, the dates of the events covered in this paper have to be spelled out clearly. Event 
day is defined as the polling day of the particular general election. In the case of Malaysia, the 
polling day for the 13th General Election was 5 May 2013, whereas the polling day for the 14th 
General Election was 9 May 2018. For Singapore, the polling day for the 2011 election was 7 
May 2011, while the 2015 election commenced on 11 May 2015. In Philippines, the 2010 
election took place on 10 May 2010, while the 2016 election was on 9 May 2016. 
.  
(ii) Methodology 
In an event study, there are two important procedures. The first is the identification of the event 
window and its size. MacKinlay (1997) recommends the use of a 41-day event window, which 
covers 20 pre-event days, the event day and 20 post event days. However, as the foreign 
exchange market could be inefficient, we allow the use of 60 post-event days instead (Wong 
and Hooy, 2016), giving a total of an 81-day event window. This is the convention used in our 
analysis for Malaysia, Singapore and Philippines. The second procedure is to set the estimation 
window over which a market model will be estimated – the estimation window size has already 
been discussed in the previous section on ‘Data’.   
 
A bigger concern is the specification of the market model, over which there is the lack of 
consensus. In this regard, there are two approaches in the literature. Firstly, there is the Frenkel 
(1981) (as cited by Mpofu and Peters 2017) ‘News Model’ of exchange rates and the model 
developed by Adam, Kozinsky and Zielinski (2013). In Frenkel (1981), the spot exchange rate 
was regressed on lagged forward rate and expected interest rate differential. Adapting this news 
model, Mpofu and Peters (2017) substituted the lagged spot exchange rate for the lagged 
forward rate. The market model of Adam, Kozinsky and Zielinski (2013) regressed the 
EUR/PLN exchange rate on EUR/USD (proxy for global factor), EUR/CZK and EUR/ HUF 
(proxies of regional factors). We initially experimented with each of these model types 
individually and found that the fit of the model was quite poor. Hence, we decided to combines 
both the elements of Frankel (1981) and Adam, Kozinsky and Zielinski (2013). This hybrid 
model for Malaysia, Singapore and Philippines are specified in Equations (1), (2) and (3) 
respectively: 
 
)]/(),/(),/(*)),(*)[(()( USDYrUSDRMBrEURUSDriiEiifMALRt −−−=    (1) 
)]/(),/(),/(*)),(*)[(()( USDYrUSDRMrEURUSDriiEiifSINRt −−−=    (2) 
)]/(),/(),/(*)),(*)[(()( USDYrUSDRMBrEURUSDriiEiifPHILRt −−−=    (3) 
where Rt represents exchange rate returns at time ‘t’ modelled as a function of the variables in 
the parenthesis. The dependent variables for the Malaysia, Singapore and Philippines market 
models use the RM/USD, SGD/USD and PHP/USD spot exchange rate returns respectively. 
In terms of the independent variables, all three models use as global proxies returns on 
USD/EUR (r(USD/EUR) and returns on Y/USD (r(Y/USD) and a country-specific expected 
interest rate differential ((i-i*) – E(i-i*))1. In addition, each model has a regional proxy, which 
is the returns on RMB/USD (r(RMB/USD) for Malaysia and Philippines, and returns on 
RM/USD (r(RM/USD) for Singapore2. To better fit the high-frequency data, the ARDL model 
structure is adopted here.   
 
In the event study methodology, the residuals from the market model regressions, i.e. ℇt is also 
defined as abnormal returns (ARs). When the ARs are aggregated across time, we obtain the 
cumulative abnormal returns (CARs). Typically, the statistical significance of ARs and CARs 
need to be tested via t-tests. The null hypotheses are specified as follows: 
0:0 =tARH            (4) 
0:0 =tCARH            (5) 
 
Meanwhile, the t-statistics are calculated as the ratio of abnormal or cumulative abnormal 
returns over the standard deviation:  
 )()( AR
ARARt t=           (6) 
)(
)(
1 ART
ARCARt t=           (7) 
In the t-statistic for abnormal returns (Equation (4)), the denominator is the standard deviation 
of the regression residuals of the market model. In Equation (5), T1 represents the size of the 
event window. 
 
1 Expected interest rate differential between domestic interest rate and a foreign interest rate is obtained by 
taking the residuals of a regression of Interest rate differential on a constant, two lagged values of interest rate 
differentials and one lagged spot exchange rate. 
2 BIS (2016, 2019) identify the EUR/USD and Y/USD to be the first and second most widely used exchange rate 
parities, respectively. The Chinese Yuan (RMB) is used here as a regional proxy for Malaysia and Philippines 
because China was the largest trade partner for both countries in terms of total trade (imports plus exports) 
during the estimation window. By a similar reasoning, the Ringgit is the chosen regional proxy for Singapore 
because Malaysia was its largest trade partner. 
 Results and Findings 
We regressed the market model specified in the previous section using an ARDL framework. 
Prior to running the regression, preliminary unit root tests were applied to each series to confirm 
that they are indeed stationary. Given the large number of estimates and to conserve space, the 
unit root tests, summary statistics and estimated models for the three exchange rates are not 
reported but are available upon request. We only briefly mention here that the estimated models 
are well-specified3, passing the standard diagnostics tests such as the Box-Pierce and Ljung-
Box tests (at various lags) and the CUSUM and CUSUMSQ tests for structural stability, while 
also demonstrating that there is no strong evidence of heteroskedasticity (the Breusch-Pagan-
Godfrey test) and ARCH effects. Using the estimated parameters of the model, we proceed to 
calculate the Abnormal Returns (ARs) and Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CARs) for the three 
events mentioned in the earlier part of the paper. In the interest of preserving space, we show 
only the charts depicting the CARs (Figures 1-6). 
 
Figure 1 - CARs for RM/USD exchange rate returns in response to the 13th General Election 
 
(Source: Author’s calculations) 
 
3 The RM/USD, SGD/USD and PHP/EUR market models have R2 of 0.31, 0.78 and 0.30, respectively 
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Figure 2 - Figure 2: CARs for RM/USD exchange rate returns in response to the 14th General 
Election 
 
Source: Author’s calculations 
 
 
Figure 3: CARs for SGD/USD exchange rate returns in response to the 2010 General Election 
 
Source: Author’s calculations 
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Figure 4: CARs for SGD/USD exchange rate returns in response to the 2015 General Election 
 
Source: Author’s calculations] 
 
Figure 5: CARs for PHP/USD exchange rate returns in response to the 2010 Presidential 
Election 
 
Source: Author’s calculations 
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Figure 6: CARs for PHP/USD exchange rate returns in response to the 2016 Presidential 
Election 
 
Source: Author’s calculations 
 
Figure 1 shows that the CARs were initially negative in response to the outcome of the 13th 
General Election (GE13). This implies that the Ringgit had been depreciating at a rate that was 
less than that predicted by the market model – a favourable response by the market. Almost 
two weeks after GE13 however, the CARs became positive, signifying that Ringgit had 
depreciated more quickly than expected, which is an unfavourable market response. The 
observed reactions here call to mind the third theoretical explanation for exchange rate 
behaviour in relation to political events mentioned in the literature review. Particularly, the 
newly elected government was able to emerge to move the country forward, indicating 
approval by the public, but the lack of subsequent political reforms dampened the enthusiasm 
for the new government (Nadzri, 2018)4. In contrast, Figure 2 projected a rather favourable 
image for the newly elected government in the aftermath of the 14th General Election (GE14) 
 
4 Given the definitions of the dependent variable (price of foreign currency in terms of RM), an increase in the 
dependent variable implies a sharper rate of RM depreciation – investors dumping RM in favour of a foreign 
currency.  
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– the event had resulted in a depreciation in the Ringgit that was less severe than that predicted 
by the market model. Apparently, this also fits closely with the second theoretical explanation 
for exchange rate responses, namely that the market is in approval of the newly formed 
government. Given that this was the first change in political regime in approximately 60 years, 
there was a chance for much-needed reforms to be pushed through. 
 
Figures 3 and 4 depict the outcomes of the 2011 and 2015 Singapore General Elections. Both 
elections led to rather similar outcomes i.e. negative and somewhat declining CARs. This 
implies that the Singapore Dollar had depreciated far less than the prediction of the market 
model (or similarly, the Singapore Dollar had appreciated more than the prediction of the 
market model). The market had responded quite favourably to the election outcomes. While 
there has been no regime change in the manner experienced by Malaysia in their GE14, the 
retention of power by the People’s Action Party (PAP) signifies not just approval from the 
voting public but also the investors in foreign exchange markets, in line with the second 
theoretical explanation. 
 
Meanwhile in the Philippines, the CARs behaved rather differently in each of the Presidential 
Elections. In Figure 5, the 2010 election brought about a rather positive market response, since 
the CARs were declining to indicate that the event had resulted in a depreciation of the 
Philippine Peso less severe than the predictions of the market model, in a manner similar to the 
GE14 event in Malaysia. The election of Benigno Aquino III was heralded as a positive event 
– as the Aquino family enjoys good reputation, this reputation effect could have carried forward 
to some of the asset markets. A stark contrast can be seen in Figure 6, when the election of 
controversial politician Rodrigo Duterte was met with a negative market response, with CARs 
ascending across the event window. This indicates that the election outcome triggered a greater 
Peso depreciation that what would have been predicted by the market model. As President 
Duterte had a reputation as a maverick with an unconventional leadership style prior to being 
elected to hold the presidential office5, his rise to power could bring about greater political 
uncertainty in line with the first theoretical explanation for exchange rate behaviour highlighted 
in the literature.  
 
Results of the statistical t-tests of ARs and CARs in both countries are reported in Tables 1, 2 
and 3. Importantly, we are unable to utilise the standard critical t-values due to the presence of 
non-normality in the regression residuals. To overcome this problem, we calculate bootstrap 
critical values in a manner similar to Bialkowski et al (2008). With these new critical values, 
we are able to proceed with the tests of statistical significance. It can be seen that a number of 
ARs and CARs are statistically significant at the 5% level, particularly on the post-event days. 
 
Table 1: t-values of Abnormal Returns (AR) and Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CAR) in 
response to the 13th (GE13) and 14th (GE14) General Elections in Malaysia  
 
Event 1: GE13 Event 2: GE14 
Event days CAR AR CAR AR 
d-20 0.919 0.102 -0.055 -0.006 
d-19 -1.534 -0.068 -1.049 -0.123 
d-18 -1.018 -0.181 -0.714 -0.202 
d-17 -0.721 -0.262 -0.126 -0.216 
d-16 0.046 -0.256 -0.104 -0.228 
d-15 -1.474 -0.420 2.048** 0.000 
d-14 0.427 -0.373 2.261** 0.251** 
d-13 0.222 -0.348 -0.175 0.232 
d-12 0.728 -0.267 -0.007 0.231 
d-11 0.622 -0.198 0.154 0.248 
d-10 -0.158 -0.216 0.795 0.336** 
d-9 -0.744 -0.298 0.254 0.365** 
d-8 0.676 -0.223 -0.471 0.312** 
d-7 -0.358 -0.263 -1.086 0.192 
 
5 See comments here: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/jul/01/philippines-president-rodrigo-
duterte-urges-people-to-kill-drug-addicts 
d-6 1.551 -0.090 -2.106 -0.042 
d-5 -0.434 -0.139 0.407 0.003 
d-4 -0.450 -0.189 -1.104 -0.120 
d-3 -0.286 -0.221 0.431 -0.072 
d-2 -0.023 -0.223 -1.178 -0.203 
d-1 3.447** 0.160 -1.572 -0.377 
d-0 -8.292** -0.762** 0.168 -0.359 
d+1 0.246 -0.734** 1.827 -0.156 
d+2 -0.409 -0.780** -1.678 -0.342 
d+3 2.328 -0.521 0.275 -0.311 
d+4 0.040 -0.517 -0.856 -0.407 
d+5 -1.723 -0.708 1.076 -0.287 
d+6 -0.001 -0.708 -0.929 -0.390 
d+7 0.900 -0.608 0.554 -0.329 
d+8 1.799 -0.408 -1.098 -0.451 
d+9 -0.146 -0.424 1.501 -0.284 
d+10 -0.330 -0.461 -1.681 -0.471 
d+11 1.008 -0.349 -0.993 -0.581 
d+12 2.131 -0.112 -1.992 -0.802 
d+13 1.359 0.039 0.566 -0.739 
d+14 1.839 0.243 0.242 -0.712 
d+15 1.190 0.375 1.375 -0.560** 
d+16 1.556 0.548 0.816 -0.469 
d+17 0.666 0.622 -0.044 -0.474 
d+18 1.345 0.771 -0.409 -0.519 
d+19 -0.582 0.707 0.144 -0.503 
d+20 -0.127 0.693 0.963 -0.396 
d+21 0.560 0.755 -0.583 -0.461 
d+22 3.679** 1.164 -2.730 -0.764 
d+23 3.557** 1.559 -4.321** -1.244 
d+24 0.306 1.593 -0.413 -1.290 
d+25 -0.095 1.582 -0.484 -1.344 
d+26 -2.209 1.337 0.455 -1.293 
d+27 1.352 1.487 -2.306 -1.550 
d+28 2.593** 1.775 -2.339 -1.809 
d+29 1.668 1.961 -2.266 -2.061 
d+30 2.486 2.237 -1.294 -2.205 
d+31 0.255 2.265 0.498 -2.150 
d+32 -0.748 2.182 -2.456 -2.423 
d+33 -1.175 2.051 1.949** -2.206 
d+34 -2.423** 1.782 0.017 -2.204 
d+35 -0.916 1.680 1.442 -2.044 
d+36 -0.057 1.674 0.072 -2.036 
d+37 -0.919 1.572 -2.779 -2.345 
d+38 0.200 1.594 -1.130 -2.470 
d+39 1.135 1.720 -0.198 -2.492 
d+40 -0.091 1.710 -2.139 -2.730 
d+41 1.842 1.915 0.207 -2.707 
d+42 -1.813 1.713 -1.114 -2.831 
d+43 -1.111 1.590 -3.328** -3.200 
d+44 -2.436 1.319 0.037 -3.196 
d+45 1.153 1.447 -2.230 -3.444 
d+46 2.384 1.712 1.483 -3.279 
d+47 1.692 1.900 0.611 -3.211 
d+48 -0.041 1.896 -0.694 -3.288 
d+49 0.107 1.908 -1.355 -3.439 
d+50 -1.914 1.695 -1.173 -3.569 
d+51 -0.728 1.614 0.579 -3.505 
d+52 1.214 1.749 0.154 -3.488 
d+53 2.529 2.030 -1.372 -3.640 
d+54 1.207 2.164 0.014 -3.639 
d+55 1.453 2.325 -1.796 -3.838** 
d+56 1.051 2.442 2.010** -3.615 
d+57 2.334 2.702** -0.905 -3.716** 
d+58 -1.214 2.567** -0.404 -3.760** 
d+59 0.925 2.670** -3.071** -4.102** 
d+60 -0.142 2.654** -0.286 -4.133** 
Note: To conserve space, the actual AR and CAR values are not reported, but are available 
upon request. ** indicates 5% level of significance based on bootstrapped critical values. 
 
Table 2: t-values of Abnormal Returns (AR) and Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CAR) in 
response to the 2011 (GE2011) and 2015 (GE2015) General Elections in Singapore  
 
Event 1: GE2011 Event 2: GE2015 
Event days CAR AR CAR AR 
d-20 0.407 0.045** 1.674 0.186** 
d-19 -0.170 0.026 2.200 0.430** 
d-18 -0.253 -0.002 -4.705** -0.092 
d-17 -0.118 -0.015 -2.037 -0.319 
d-16 0.139 0.001 -0.925 -0.421 
d-15 0.211 0.024 -1.192 -0.554 
d-14 0.171 0.043 -0.372 -0.595 
d-13 -0.229 0.017 0.202 -0.573 
d-12 0.214 0.041** -1.760 -0.768 
d-11 1.270 0.182** 0.715 -0.689 
d-10 -0.304 0.149** -2.125 -0.925 
d-9 -3.256** -0.213 -2.945 -1.252 
d-8 -2.240** -0.462 -1.196 -1.385 
d-7 -0.976 -0.571 1.971 -1.166 
d-6 1.510 -0.403 6.410** -0.454 
d-5 -1.103 -0.525 -2.187 -0.697 
d-4 -0.247 -0.553 0.750 -0.613 
d-3 1.794** -0.353 -1.750 -0.808 
d-2 -0.500 -0.409 -2.703 -1.108 
d-1 -0.026 -0.412 -3.366 -1.482 
d-0 -0.821 -0.503 1.296 -1.338 
d+1 -0.705 -0.581 -0.705 -1.417 
d+2 -0.309 -0.616 -2.623 -1.708 
d+3 -0.319 -0.651 2.084 -1.476 
d+4 -0.162 -0.669 1.909 -1.264 
d+5 2.248** -0.419 -2.039 -1.491 
d+6 0.143 -0.403 0.265 -1.462 
d+7 -2.435** -0.674 -1.940 -1.677 
d+8 -0.737 -0.756 -0.136 -1.692 
d+9 -0.161 -0.774 2.045 -1.465 
d+10 -0.514 -0.831 1.364 -1.313 
d+11 0.653 -0.758 2.462 -1.040 
d+12 0.333 -0.721 -0.746 -1.123 
d+13 0.163 -0.703 2.773 -0.815 
d+14 -0.273 -0.734 3.860 -0.386 
d+15 0.117 -0.721 2.467 -0.112 
d+16 -0.535 -0.780 -4.214** -0.580 
d+17 1.858** -0.574 -3.692** -0.990 
d+18 -0.133 -0.588 -2.996 -1.323 
d+19 0.432 -0.540 -2.551 -1.606 
d+20 0.189 -0.519 -0.094 -1.617 
d+21 -0.277 -0.550 -2.589 -1.904** 
d+22 -0.305 -0.584 0.698 -1.827** 
d+23 -0.709 -0.663 0.288 -1.795 
d+24 -0.539 -0.723 -0.488 -1.849** 
d+25 0.292 -0.690 0.099 -1.838** 
d+26 -1.295 -0.834 0.809 -1.748 
d+27 0.074 -0.826 0.802 -1.659 
d+28 0.224 -0.801 -1.133 -1.785 
d+29 0.791 -0.713 0.795 -1.697 
d+30 0.578 -0.649 -0.579 -1.761 
d+31 -0.020 -0.651 0.202 -1.738 
d+32 -0.637 -0.722 0.878 -1.641 
d+33 -0.429 -0.770 0.565 -1.578 
d+34 0.934 -0.666 -1.467 -1.741 
d+35 1.144 -0.539 0.249 -1.713 
d+36 0.656 -0.466 0.644 -1.642 
d+37 -1.482 -0.631 -0.037 -1.646 
d+38 -0.128 -0.645 -0.061 -1.653 
d+39 0.476 -0.592 1.081 -1.533 
d+40 -0.777 -0.678 1.805 -1.332 
d+41 -1.375 -0.831 1.786 -1.134 
d+42 -0.541 -0.891 1.655 -0.950 
d+43 -2.032** -1.117 -2.566 -1.235 
d+44 -0.282 -1.148 -0.111 -1.247 
d+45 0.041 -1.144 0.726 -1.166 
d+46 -0.458 -1.194 -0.044 -1.171 
d+47 -0.270 -1.224** 0.711 -1.092 
d+48 -0.810 -1.315** -1.157 -1.221 
d+49 0.515 -1.257** 1.408 -1.065 
d+50 0.481 -1.204** -0.737 -1.146 
d+51 0.612 -1.136 0.014 -1.145 
d+52 0.429 -1.088 0.284 -1.113 
d+53 0.268 -1.058 -0.266 -1.143 
d+54 0.665 -0.984 -0.262 -1.172 
d+55 -1.478 -1.149 -0.771 -1.258 
d+56 -0.075 -1.157 -0.492 -1.312 
d+57 1.268 -1.016 1.137 -1.186 
d+58 -1.051 -1.133 1.995 -0.964 
d+59 0.180 -1.113 -1.140 -1.091 
d+60 -0.395 -1.157 -0.711 -1.170 
Note: To conserve space, the actual AR and CAR values are not reported, but are available 
upon request. ** indicates 5% level of significance based on bootstrapped critical values. 
 
Table 3: t-values of Abnormal Returns (AR) and Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CAR) in 
response to the 2010 (PGE2010) and 2016 (PGE2016) Presidential Elections in Philippines  
 
Event 1: GE2011 Event 2: GE2015 
Event days CAR AR CAR AR 
d-20 -0.849 -0.094** -0.190 -0.021 
d-19 -0.439 -0.143 0.381 0.021 
d-18 -0.541 -0.203 0.285 0.053 
d-17 0.244 -0.176 0.228 0.078 
d-16 -0.956 -0.283 0.131 0.093 
d-15 -0.417 -0.329 -0.379 0.051 
d-14 -0.784 -0.416 0.025 0.053 
d-13 -0.647 -0.488 -0.350 0.015 
d-12 -0.543 -0.548 0.176 0.034 
d-11 -0.756 -0.632 -0.048 0.029 
d-10 -0.835 -0.725 0.587 0.094 
d-9 0.361 -0.685 -0.002 0.094 
d-8 0.361 -0.645 0.855** 0.189 
d-7 0.076 -0.636 0.450 0.239 
d-6 -0.824 -0.728 0.047 0.244 
d-5 -0.263 -0.757 1.153** 0.372 
d-4 1.086 -0.636 0.872** 0.469** 
d-3 0.332 -0.600 0.072 0.477** 
d-2 -0.081 -0.609 -0.587 0.412** 
d-1 1.370 -0.456 -0.142 0.396 
d-0 -2.632** -0.749 -0.316 0.361 
d+1 0.024 -0.746 0.443 0.410** 
d+2 1.037 -0.631 -0.826 0.318 
d+3 2.795** -0.320 -0.302 0.285 
d+4 2.057** -0.092** 0.173 0.304 
d+5 -0.092 -0.102** 0.671 0.379 
d+6 -0.794 -0.190 -0.023 0.376 
d+7 -1.036 -0.305 -0.829 0.284 
d+8 -2.895** -0.627 0.453 0.334 
d+9 1.172 -0.497 -1.605** 0.156 
d+10 0.290 -0.465 -0.295 0.123 
d+11 1.073 -0.345 0.211 0.147 
d+12 0.644 -0.274 0.686 0.223 
d+13 1.803 -0.073 -0.033 0.219 
d+14 -0.161 -0.091 0.466 0.271 
d+15 -2.095 -0.324 0.589 0.336 
d+16 0.111 -0.312 0.423 0.383 
d+17 -2.584** -0.599 -0.859 0.288 
d+18 -1.034 -0.714 0.411 0.334 
d+19 2.151** -0.475 -1.171 0.204 
d+20 -1.856 -0.681 -0.407 0.158 
d+21 0.057 -0.675 -0.386 0.115 
d+22 -1.344 -0.824 -2.192** -0.128 
d+23 -0.189 -0.845 -0.277 -0.159 
d+24 1.234 -0.708 -0.878 -0.256 
d+25 -0.611 -0.776 -0.053 -0.262 
d+26 0.816 -0.685 0.728** -0.181 
d+27 -0.532 -0.744 -0.485 -0.235 
d+28 -0.346 -0.783 0.255 -0.207 
d+29 -2.401 -1.049 0.208 -0.184 
d+30 -2.259 -1.300 -0.263 -0.213 
d+31 -0.606 -1.368 0.197 -0.191 
d+32 1.584 -1.192 0.109 -0.179 
d+33 0.825 -1.100 0.377 -0.137 
d+34 0.357 -1.060 0.226 -0.112 
d+35 -1.149 -1.188 -0.383 -0.155 
d+36 -0.158 -1.205 0.380 -0.112 
d+37 0.460 -1.154 -0.027 -0.116 
d+38 0.604 -1.087 0.168 -0.097 
d+39 -0.563 -1.150 -0.467 -0.149 
d+40 0.513 -1.093 -0.817 -0.239 
d+41 0.035 -1.089 -1.008** -0.351** 
d+42 0.231 -1.063 0.341 -0.314** 
d+43 0.069 -1.055 0.000 -0.314** 
d+44 -2.036 -1.282 0.361 -0.273 
d+45 -1.152 -1.410** 0.584 -0.209 
d+46 0.247 -1.382** 0.592 -0.143 
d+47 0.531 -1.323 0.286 -0.111 
d+48 0.246 -1.296 -0.837 -0.204 
d+49 -0.338 -1.333 -0.395 -0.248 
d+50 0.423 -1.286 0.507 -0.192 
d+51 -2.878** -1.606** 0.480 -0.138 
d+52 1.068 -1.488** 0.126 -0.124 
d+53 3.718** -1.074 -0.278 -0.155 
d+54 -0.870 -1.171 -0.372 -0.197 
d+55 -0.255 -1.199 -0.670 -0.271 
d+56 0.018 -1.197 0.062 -0.264 
d+57 0.224 -1.172 0.241 -0.237 
d+58 0.381 -1.130 -0.449 -0.287 
d+59 -0.201 -1.152 -0.455 -0.338** 
d+60 0.125 -1.139 -0.266 -0.367** 
Note: To conserve space, the actual AR and CAR values are not reported, but are available 
upon request. ** indicates 5% level of significance based on bootstrapped critical values. 
 
Conclusion and implications 
This paper is a contribution to the literature on the politics-asset markets nexus. We focus 
particularly on how political events, proxied by general elections, affect foreign exchange 
returns. Our study is conducted within an Event Study framework.  Our main findings are as 
follows. First, the 13th General Election in Malaysia led to a mostly negative response from the 
foreign exchange market, with a sharper than expected Ringgit depreciation. Second, the 14th 
Malaysian General Election elicited a rather positive reaction from the foreign exchange 
market – there was far less depreciation of the Ringgit than what was previously believed. 
Third, both the 2011 and 2015 General Elections in Singapore were followed by positive 
reactions from the market. Fourth, presidential elections in the Philippines produced 
contrasting results – the election of Benigno Aquino III was greeted with optimism, whereas 
his successor, Rodrigo Duterte received a less welcoming reception from the foreign exchange 
market, with the Philippine Peso depreciating more than the predicted amount in the market 
model. 
 
These findings represent a contribution to the literature on political events and asset market 
responses, highlighted in the literature review section. Some practical implications follow from 
here. It can be seen from the tri-country experience in this paper that the market response to 
election outcomes depends very much on the reputation of the newly elected government. For 
Singapore, the governments formed my members of the PAP have always enjoyed good 
reputation historically – a re-election of the same political party simply means a continuity of 
policies that have benefited Singapore. In the same vein, political parties/candidates for 
election with poor reputation (the winner of the GE13 in Malaysia and the 2016 Presidential 
Election in Philippines) triggered negative reactions from the market.6 These findings would 
mean arbitrage opportunities for investors. Candidates with good track-record and spotless 
reputation would trigger either a larger than expected domestic currency appreciation or a 
smaller than expected domestic currency depreciation. Going long on the domestic currency 
prior to polling day may result in profit-taking. This suggestion is all the more valid given that 
foreign exchange markets in these countries take quite a long time to adjust in response to new 
events, suggesting market inefficiency in the manner of the Efficient Markets Hypothesis 
(EMH). 
 
6 Malaysia had been ruled by the Barisan Nasional (BN) coalition for over 60 years with no break in continuity. 
The regime had become plagued by allegations of corruption and hence reforms are very much needed. The 
re-election of BN to power in GE13 meant that reforms would be shelved to preserve the status quo. The 
Duterte regime in Philippines is a similar case, with the newly elected President himself affected by a particular 
reputation for maverick behaviour. 
 Second, the fact that a political entity gets voted into power (voter popularity) does not 
automatically translate to acceptance by financial markets, which are more concerned about 
where the economy is heading. A populist leader may run counter to sound economic 
management. In this sense, fluctuations in exchange rates mirror closely the market sentiments 
in regard to whether the political leader is doing a good job. Since exchange rate movements 
are available on almost a real-time basis, exchange rate data offers more timely updates on the 
performance of the government of the day as compared to public opinion polls. A government 
could analyse exchange rate movements as a measure of how well they are performing. 
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